The Political Conundrum!

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/30/defense-official-obama-calling-defense-budget-cuts/

I won’t say I am surprised, but I am highly disappointed. First the order to stop the trials at Gitmo, then the plans to shut Gitmo within the year, and now this. True to form….Democrats, especially inexperienced, ultra-liberal Democrats are not friends of the military.

God help this country.

Oh an my poll answer is definitely changed. I don’t need to wait any longer, he has pretty much ruined any chance that I will support him at all. And he did that within 11 days of taking office.

Bouhammer out…

If you are interested in knowing how we got where we are today in the Global War on Terror, but more importantly the war we fight in Afghanistan then you need to check your local listings to watch “Inside The Taliban” on National Geographic Channel. Afghanistan has a long and colorful history as a country, but this only goes back to the post-Soviet timeframe. It covers in depth how Mullah Omar came into power, how Osama Bin Laden got into the country and who he was invited by (hint, it wasn’t the Taliban), and the culture that Afghanistan has which still exists today. This was not produced until 2006, while I was there which is a shame becuase I would have loved to have this knowledge before I went. In fact my Commanding General (BG Pritt), in Afghanistan is interviewed a few times during this documentary.

Again, this film really explains a lot and I think for anyone that cares about what is happening in Afghanistan, is about to go to Afghanistan or has been there and would like to know more about how they ended up there and maybe some of the reasons they saw the stuff they did…..this film is for you. You can read about it on National Geographic’s website at http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274/Overview

The U.S. needs a new military strategy in Afghanistan, and has made clear -- through General David Petraeus, the new head of CENTCOM -- that it intends to try to replicate the success of Iraq's Awakening movement in Afghanistan. Iraq's Awakening was an alliance of Sunni tribesmen, Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others who were united by the goal of driving al-Qaeda from their country. In considering how the U.S. will try to foster such a movement in Afghanistan, there is no better place to start than a 47-page memorandum written by Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, the leader of Iraq's Awakening, that was submitted to the American embassy in Kabul last spring.

In an article published in the new issue of the Weekly Standard, my colleague Joshua Goodman and I analyze Abu Risha's memo, and the prospect of an Afghan Awakening. An excerpt:

Abu Risha reviews several challenges in Afghanistan. The country is beset by warlords and their followers, who "are accustomed to living freely without the rule of law." There is great distrust of Hamid Karzai's government, which some Afghans believe is conspiring with the United States in "Americanizing and changing the identity of the Afghan people." This distrust is magnified by the country's living conditions: The economy is poor, with wages low and unemployment high. Despite improvements, the government has been unable to provide adequate education and health care.

These internal factors are compounded, in Abu Risha's view, by a military picture unfavorable to the United States. He argues that "military attacks by air against Taliban locations will cause the loss of many civilian lives," and so are likely to generate hostility to U.S. and NATO forces.

Abu Risha argues, nevertheless, that there are parallels between Afghanistan today and Iraq's Anbar Province in 2006 and 2007. Most important, al Qaeda and affiliated groups in Afghanistan have created a "climate of terror" similar to what they created in Anbar, where "they murdered anyone who opposed or criticized their actions and behavior." As in Anbar, he believes, an Awakening could help Afghanistan reverse its present deadly course.

Abu Risha outlines some preconditions for success. First and foremost is the need for a strong leader. In Anbar, this was the late Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, Abu Risha's brother, assassinated in late 2007. Such a figure must have "charisma, outstanding leadership elements and courage," he should be "a man of honor, tolerant and persistent," and he should be "a center of trust" with "a political family background." Abu Risha emphasizes, however, that NATO should not try to establish new leadership in Afghanistan, but should work within the tribes' existing hierarchies. "This is a nation," he writes, "that does not accept changes or give up control easily without a fight."

Sterling Jensen, who participated as an Army contract linguist in the U.S. government's engagement with the Iraqi tribes as the Anbar Awakening was taking shape in the fall of 2006, agrees that Abdul Sattar's leadership was critical. "The Americans didn't make the Awakening," Jensen says. "They didn't make Sheikh Ahmed or Sheikh Abdul Sattar. You can influence some [local leaders'] thinking, but it's going to be the Americans recognizing these kinds of leaders, and supporting them."

You can read the full article here.

The Iraqi journalist who hurled his shoes at former US president George W. Bush in Baghdad has voted in secret from his prison cell in the country's provincial election, a court official said.

The Navy's top admiral signaled Friday that he's prepared for a fight over plans to relocate a Norfolk-based aircraft carrier to Florida and insisted that the shift is "in the best interest of the nation."

Fidel Castro on threw his first punch at President Barack Obama after several weeks of praise for the new leader, demanding the U.S. return Guantanamo Bay military base to Cuba and criticizing the U.S. defense of Israel.

The State Department said Friday it will not renew Blackwater Worldwide's contract to protect American diplomats in Iraq when it expires in May.

Iraqis passed through security checkpoints and razor-wire cordons to vote in provincial elections that are considered a crucial test of the nation's stability as U.S. officials consider the pace of troop withdrawals. Polls opened after a step-by-step security clampdown across the country, including traffic bans in central Baghdad and other cities.

LATE NOTICE- This week Scott Kesterson will be screening AT WAR at the Oregon Military Department. The screening will be on Friday, 30 January 2009 at 4pm in Conference Room 436. It is open to all military personnel.

In the wake of the Gaza war, finding ways to provide much needed humanitarian support to the residents of Gaza—without inadvertently empowering Hamas—is of paramount concern. Unfortunately, problems remain with two of the primary vehicles the U.S. government intends to use to provide newly pledged aid, namely the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Today, the U.S. government announced that President Barack Obama has authorized the use of $20.3 million from the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund “to address critical post-conflict humanitarian needs in Gaza.” According to the State Department press release, of the $20.3 million in new ERMA funds, $13.5 million will go to UNRWA, $6 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and $800,000 to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Beyond the contributions to UNRWA, ICRC and OCHA, State’s press release noted, USAID has provided more than $3.7 million for emergency assistance to Gaza.”

These may in fact represent the most appropriate of the available options to get humanitarian aid to the residents of Gaza, but in the cases of both UNRWA and USAID recent history highlights areas of particular concern.

Both UNRWA and USAID do important work, and in the current environment are especially important players. That they both need significant improvement should be reason for increased focus and attention, not despair. There is no better place to start than with the implementation of the new USAID Partner Vetting System and the many detailed policy prescriptions offered in James Lindsay’s groundbreaking new study, Fixing UNRWA: Repairing the UN’s Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian Refugees .

My full article, written for the Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH), can be found here.