The Political Conundrum!

After close to twenty years of activity in the United States, Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) entered the public stage in June 2009; transitioning into the second phase of the implementation of its strategy to establish a Caliphate. Over the past few months, and particularly in the last few weeks, I have posted updates for Counterterrorism Blog readers on the maturation of HTA and its plans to host a conference titled "The Fall of Capitalism and the Rise of Islam," which is scheduled for July 19 at the Hilton in Oak Lawn, Illinois. In response to my articles, I have noticed speculation on the prospective turnout to the event. It is certainly important to wonder the exact size of a group that opposes the United States and its policies, however, until the day of the conference, it will be difficult to determine how large a support base HTA has, or whether its American adherents will be willing to demonstrate their affiliation publicly by attending the conference.

There are some small but visible signs of prospective attendance. In the last two weeks, three Facebook pages have been created to promote HTA's Khilafah Conference. More than 100 of those invited on the Facebook pages have indicated that they may attend, and approximately 40 have confirmed that they will definitely attend.

The Facebook page with the largest number of invitees to the conference (more than 1000) is administered by Abdur Rafay. Rafay belongs to the "Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine & Science Grad Student '12" and the "N. Illinois Alum '06" networks on Facebook. The second Khilafah Conference page is administered by Meenara Jamal Khan, who is part of the "Chicago" network on Facebook. The third page, and the least popular of the three, is administered by someone who uses the name Kalifat Hamza.

If conferences held by young branches of HT in other countries are any indication of prospective turnout in Oak Lawn, the attendance for HTA's first publicly promoted conference will be relatively small. Also, as the United States is a large country, HTA's membership is scattered from coast to coast, and some may find it difficult to travel to Chicago for a one-day conference. Chicago appears to be the most active chapter of HTA, however, even some members and supporters in the immediate area may be reluctant to appear in person at an event that would publicly reveal their affiliation.

Older, well-established branches of HT, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, attract several hundred attendees to most of their events. Generally speaking, however, most branches in western democracies do not attract as many supporters to rallies and conferences. By contract, the Indonesian branch of HT held its Khilafah conference in a sports stadium in August 2007. The conference was attended by tens of thousands of members and supporters. Smaller branches are able to fill a large hotel conference room. In HTA's case, it anticipates hosting enough attendees to fill the Grand Ballroom of the Hilton Oak Lawn.

  “Give me your ammo and I will take it out to the observation post (OP).”  This is what I told my active duty counterpart after one of our joint (US and Afghan) OPs had been in a firefight.  I was the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the company size element of Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and my fellow active duty CPT was the OIC of the company of US soldiers at this small, remote Forward Operating Base (FOB) near the Afghan-Pakistan border.   

The problem that my fellow CPT was having was the issue with the weather and the limitations it puts on our forces.  The weather had taken a turn for the worse and it placed a restriction on movement outside the wire.  At least for US forces.  This is where I was trying to convince him that I could move with my ANA forces regardless of the weather (although not recommended), and I could re-supply the OP as both the ANA and US forces were dangerously low on ammo after the latest attack.  To me, this was an easy choice.  The boys on the OP needed ammo and I was willing to do everything I could to get it to them.  I knew if I was on the OP and needed ammo, I would want someone willing to re-supply me.  What also was bothering me was the fact of having less then 1 hour of daylight remaining and the trip to the OP was 40 minutes round trip, and that’s not counting the transfer time of the ammo.  For US forces darkness isn’t an issue with our night vision but the ANA don’t have that capability and have to drive with their lights on at night.  Not a great idea to do when having to drive through bad guy territory.

After being unable to persuade my counterpart to partake in the loophole that I offered with my ANA, I decided to go and check on the status of the ANA and the loading of their vehicles for the ammo re-supply.   To my surprise they were almost finished with the loading so I went back to see if my fellow CPT was finished dragging his feet on making a decision.  He actually said yes to my offer of assistance but he needed time to get the ammo around.  I was pretty ticked by now as hadn’t even started rounding up the ammo and my ANA were ready to roll.  They in turn weren’t happy either as we lost another 20 minutes of daylight due to a leader not thinking of what his next 1-2 steps needs to be.

By the time we left the wire there was only a few minutes of daylight remaining and we soon had to turn on our headlights.  Nothing screams ”HERE I AM” louder then  5 vehicles driving on the Afghan-Pakistan border towards a spot in which every bad guy in the area had just attacked, and we all have our headlights on.  Was the pucker factor up a bit more then normal?  Yes, but we had a job to do and you just drive on by focusing on the mission.  Once my vehicle finally came to a halt on the OP, the first thing I heard was “Sir, we are so glad to see you!”  It was easy to identify that the ANA and Americans still had the adrenaline pumping through their systems and they all were in good spirits.  We quickly unloaded the ammo and then my ETT NCO partner and I braced ourselves for the return leg of our white knuckled sprint along the border with the lights on. 

We made it back to FOB Tillman that night without any issues.  Sometimes you just have to throw caution (and common sense) to the wind and go with your instincts.

Live Free or Die Trying!

I first talked about this story of Lt. Brian Bradshaw on June 27th here, www.bouhammer.com/2009/06/someone-more-important-than-michael-jackson-died/ and again here two days later, www.bouhammer.com/2009/06/great-words-from-1lt-brian-bradshaw/.

Now it is the lead story on FoxNews.com this morning, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,530361,00.html

I am glad that this story and that outrageous behavior of the media is being highlighted.

 

H/T to jw for tip.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has issued a new directive aimed at avoiding civilian casualties, warning that "the Taliban cannot militarily defeat us -- but we can defeat ourselves."

Bombs and bullets killed seven American troops while three NATO troops died in a helicopter crash in one of the deadliest days ever for foreign troops in Afghanistan. Four of the deaths Monday came in an attack on a team of U.S. military trainers in the relatively peaceful north.

When the new GI Bill kicks in Aug. 1, the government's best-known education program for veterans will get the biggest boost since its World War II-era creation. But the benefit is hardly the "Government Issue," one-size-fits-all standard the name implies.

Robert S. McNamara, the brainy Pentagon chief who directed the escalation of the Vietnam War despite private doubts the war was winnable or worth fighting, died Monday at 93.

Working to turn Russia from antagonist to ally, President Barack Obama asked the Russian people Tuesday to "forge a lasting partnership" with the U.S., but he acknowledged after talks with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that on divisive issues there won't be "a meeting of the minds anytime soon."

The Air Force is looking for a few good men. More specifically, a few holy men. The military has long faced a shortage of chaplains and is dealing with what it considers a critical shortage of Roman Catholic priests.

For those interested in exploring one of the greatest internal and transnational threats to the United States, there is a new book out today by Samuel Logan, This is For the Mara Salvatrucha: Inside the MS-13, America's Most Violent Gang.

The book traces the history of Brenda Paz, a young Honduran who joins MS-13 and eventually becomes the most effective police witness against the organization, before she was killed. But besides the individual story, the book shows just how powerful and ruthless the MS-13 has become. Given that it now has chapters in thousands of cities across the United States, and maintains its transnational structure through the clan structure in Central America, the gang (or mara in Spanish) presents a significant challenge.

But it is not just a local law enforcement issue. It is truly a transnational threat that can destroy countries. Yesterday I heard Carlos Castresana Fernandez, head of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala-CICIG) discuss the serious problems of the organized criminal networks operating out of Guatemala.

He noted how the already-disturbing situation in Guatemala had gotten dramatically worse in the past three years and Mexican and Colombian cartel operatives, particularly Los Zetas, moved in and took control of local criminal operations.

The cartels were aided and abetted in their takeover efforts by the local gangs, primarily MS-13. On Guatemala's northern border with Mexico, Castresana Fernandez said, the organized criminal groups and gangs are the only authority, in the face of the complete absence of the state. "Maras plus organized crime has proven deadly," he said.

That is the reality on the ground in much of Central America. The gangs are increasingly moving from local criminal operations, coordinated with their partner gangs in the United States, to move illicit products like stolen cars, methamphetamine and weapons, into the muscle for the drug cartels.

The consequences, as Castresana Fernandez noted, is that already weak and corrupt police forces and militaries are simply overwhelmed or bought, allowing the gangs to grow in power both in their home countries and in this country. The richer they become the bigger threat they become, both here and south of our border.

The book offers an inside look at how the gangs operate at granular level. For those of us who spent time with the gangs (I did for a Washington Post series in 1998), it is a harrowing and accurate description of the amazing and disturbing world that gang members inhabit. It also places the development of the gangs and the recruitment of gang members in its proper context of displacement, social dislocation and family separation that has helped define the Central American immigrant narrative.

I am not one who worries a great deal about the use of Hezbollah or other terrorist groups of gang-controlled pipelines to enter the United States. With embassies in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua etc. all willing to issue valid travel documents to them, it is hard to see why they would bother with the riskier and more vulnerable method of moving over the land border clandestinely.

But it is clear that these gangs and cartels are, in their own right, becoming increasingly strong transnational threats, and that they offer other services to Hezbollah and other groups that would be useful-drug trafficking routes, protection of the pipelines they use etc. To understand why the gangs are a threat, this book is a good place to start.