The Political Conundrum!

For more than a week, there has been a flurry of counter-terrorism raids across the country. This comes just ten days before President Barack Obama is set to make his first visit to Indonesia since spending part of his elementary school years in Jakarta.
Initially the police focused their attention on a 50-strong group of militants that was allegedly conducting paramilitary training at the foot of a mountain on the border of Pidie and Aceh Besar districts in Aceh province. As of this week, the police had killed or arrested nearly 20 persons tied to this group. They have also confiscated a small number of assault rifles, military uniforms purchased in Malaysia, and videotapes of various deceased Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members.
Although the police investigation in Aceh is ongoing, it would appear like several of the members were not ethnic Acehnese and could instead be traced to the island of Java. This is an interesting development, as the Acehnese have traditionally exhibited fierce animosity toward those from Java, and many have found it hard to believe that the two sides have now put aside their long-standing differences to conduct risky paramilitary training in a relatively populated area of Aceh. Others have noted that the Acehnese, while pious and prone toward separatism, have rarely shown any radical tendencies along the Wahhabist lines pushed by JI.
But the questions raised by all this pale in comparison to developments yesterday. After the Indonesian authorities earlier announced that some of the Aceh gang could be traced back to Banten province on Java, and specifically the area of Pamulang (which is just outside the Jakarta city limits), the police conducted a pair of raids in Pamulang. The Indonesian media has since been speculating that at least one of the dead is Dul Matin, a JI electronics expert linked to the 2002 Bali bombings. It had been thought that Dul Matin had been in the southern Philippines since at least 2003, where he had been given sanctuary by both the MILF and Abu Sayyaf Group. But the media is now speculating that he made his way into Indonesia and was hiding out in a Pamulang house owned by a medical doctor that he had befriended during the communal violence in Ambon during 1999. That Dul Matin would risk taking up shelter on the outskirts of Jakarta on face appears to be out of character for a terrorist known for his caution as much as his extremism. The police expect the result of a DNA test to confirm the identity of the corpse later today.

In 2006, Hizballah's popularity peaked in the Arab world as a result of its military performance against Israel. That summer, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization fought Israel to a standstill in south Lebanon. Since then, however, the organization's popularity has plummeted in the region, largely due to a series of miscues in Lebanon and abroad.

I wrote a lenghty article in the Weekly Standard online describing the drop in Hizballah's regional popularity since 2006, and the steps the organization has taken to get its mojo back. Bottom line: when the "Islamic Resistance in Lebanon" (as it calls itself) is not actively "resisting" Israel, the Shiite militia appears to hold little appeal in the Arab world. The article can be found here, and below.

The confrontation in the sub Indian continent between al Qaeda, the Taliban and their allies on the one hand and the three democracies they target, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, on the other hand must be reevaluated in terms of international cooperation against the Jihadi threat. A regional system should be established to integrate the struggle against all Jihadi forces in the subcontinent. There needs to be a separation between the ethnic and territorial questions from the fight against Terrorism. Once that distinction is made the possibilities of internationalization of counter terrorism will be high. Jihadists based in any country of the subcontinent must not be given legitimacy by any Government on the ground of a local ethnic issue. Jihadi forces must be confronted collectively, while diplomacy and international mediations assist in solving the local problems.

In the coming weeks, the United States and its allies will attempt to push additional Iran sanctions through the UN Security Council. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has indicated that "the United States and like-minded countries" could also impose at least some additional sanctions on their own. Although stronger sanctions are certainly needed to deter Iran on the nuclear issue, they alone are unlikely to pressure Tehran into changing its behavior. Just as important are efforts to plug the gaps and loopholes in the current sanctions regime.

Iranian Evasion

A number of overlapping sanctions are already in place against Iran, imposed by the UN, European Union, Britain, and the United States. One of the primary means of evading these regimes is through re-exports. Generally, export-control laws distinguish between different countries in determining the legality of a specific transaction. For example, dual-use goods, which can have commercial or military applications (including in the nuclear sector), may be sent to some countries but not to others. Iran often takes advantage of this framework, evading U.S. laws and international sanctions by setting up front companies and middlemen in countries to which these types of items can be legally exported. In most cases, the sellers are not told that the goods will be re-exported to Iran -- though many other sellers are willing to turn a blind eye.

The best known of these re-export hubs is Dubai, where thousands of Iranian businesses engage in illicit trade. Extensive re-export networks can also be found in Malaysia, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, and Europe. These networks allow Iranians to procure much-needed American and European technology that they would otherwise be unable to obtain. A recent Associated Press report described a case in which a Chinese company used a Taiwan-based agent to divert more than a hundred pressure gauges (a device with both commercial and nuclear applications) to Iran, misleading the Swiss seller about the ultimate destination.

Iran's procurement networks extend to U.S. shores as well. In December 2009, for example, California-based suspect Jirair Avanessian was indicted for illegally exporting a specialized vacuum pump -- a device with potential nuclear applications -- to Iran via the United Arab Emirates. According to the Justice Department, he was directed by an individual in Iran.

To read the rest of the piece, click here.

While Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has long viewed criticism of his autocratic rule and growing abuses as part of the impending Yanqui invasion, he has suffered two significant blows in the past week and the United States was not part of either. The developments are further signs that Chávez is finally being understood as an anti-democratic strongman who consistently supports terrorist groups that the rest of the world shuns.

The most recent blow came from a Spanish judge who linked the Chávez government to support for the Basque terrorist organization ETA, as well as the Colombian FARC, in attempts to assassinate senior Colombian officials.

The allegations, made in a court document by investigating magistrate Eloy Velasco, said that the Chávez government had acted as an intermediary between Eta and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group.

"There is evidence in this case which shows the Venezuelan government's co-operation in the illegal association between Farc and Eta," the magistrate said as he issued international arrest warrants for six alleged Eta members and seven Colombians believed to be members of Farc.

At the center of the controversy is Arturo Cubillas, an alleged Eta member who works in Venezuela's ministry of agriculture, who was named as the main link among the three groups: the Venezuelan government, FARC and ETA. Cubillas, who has lived in Venezuela since 1989, is married to a senior member of Chávez's government.

The allegations appeared to confirm Colombian intelligence reports that the FARC and ETA have worked together often and exchanged technological know-how and training.

The judge said that two Farc members, Victor Vargas and Gustavo Navarro, had travelled to Spain twice to identify possible targets among the Colombian community for assassination.

He said the Farc members had relied on Eta for support during their visit, and attempts had also been made to find a way of killing President Alvaro Uribe during a visit to Spain.
My full blog is here.

My colleague David Schenker and I argue in an article on the state of Hizballah that a successful Hizballah attack against an Israeli target -- whether on the Israeli-Lebanese border or abroad - to avenge the assassination of Imad Mughniyah two years ago last month could set off another round of fighting similar to that of 2006. Several Hizballah plots abroad have been thwarted, but the group seems intent on trying again and is rearming in Lebanon as well. Oh, to have been a fly on the wall at a recent dinner in Damascus ....

On February 26, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad hosted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah for a dinner in Damascus. Nasrallah is a routine guest in the capital, but the timing of this high-profile trip -- just a week after the United States dispatched Undersecretary of State William Burns to Damascus and nominated its first new ambassador in five years -- seemed calculated not only to irritate Washington, but also to highlight the central role Hizballah plays in Iran and Syria's strategic planning. Apart from serving as a pivot between Tehran and Damascus, however, the group also holds the power to engulf Lebanon and perhaps the entire region into another war through actions of its own.

The complete article is available here.

Asian Security Conference 2010

In an address to the Asian Security Conference 2010 under the theme “Asian Strategic Futures 2030: Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives.” I made a presentation under the title: “The Future of Terrorism: Jihadi threat in the Indian Subcontinent.” The Conference, organized by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, was addressed by India's Prime Minister, Defense Minister and officials as well as international experts live and via satellite. In this adapted piece I argue that the fight against the Jihadists must become internationalized.

I wish to flag the latest Crisis Group report on the threat emanating from the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) which remains active and dangerous despite continuous government crackdowns. Undoubtedly a well researched report titled "The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh" (Crisis Group Asia Report No. 187, 1 March 2010), assesses the ongoing danger JMB poses to the state and possibly to the region.

Here is a brief excerpt for CTBlog readers:

The danger from JMB is exacerbated by its links to other Bangladeshi and international jihadi groups and to members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in Britain. New information has revealed operational ties to LeT and to al-Muhajiroun, the groups whose members took part in the London underground bombings of July 2005. There has also been collaboration between JMB and a splinter of the once formidable but now diminished Harkat-ul-Jihadal- Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-B).

Bangladesh’s political mainstream has long understood the danger posed by JMB but has either deliberately used it for narrow political ends, as during the coalition government led by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) from 2006 to 2007, or been distracted by other concerns. The current Awami League government is especially aware of the problem as its members have been victims of attacks. But internal wrangling, lack of coordination between security agencies and the absence of a single
counter-terrorism force have undermined any sustained effort to dismantle the organisation.

For the Executive Summary, Read Here.

For Full Text, Read Here.

On February 25, the Washington Institute held an event on Al Qaeda's safehavens -- a topic of growing concern in Washington since the failed Christmas day attack revealed how the group has been exploiting the undergoverned territory in Yemen to plot attacks against the US. Tom Krajeski, the former US Ambassador to Yemen, covered the factors that have enabled AQAP to operate in that country, but was optimistic that with increased US-Yemeni cooperation, we would succeed in dramatically weakening the group.

Seth Jones, a political scientist at RAND, spoke about the al Qaeda/Taliban presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and how these governments are responding, and Andre Le Sage, a professor at the National Defense University, discussed the state of al Qaeda and al-Shabab in Somalia.

Here is a rapporteur's summary of the event:

Al Qaeda's affiliates and safehavens is an area of increased focus for the Washington Institute. We have recently published a series of articles on this subject, including: a piece by Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University on AQAP; a piece by Stephen Tankel of Carnegie on Laskhar e -Taiba, and a two part piece by Andre Le Sage on al Qaeda/al Shabab in Somalia (click here and here).

Could it be that while the Taliban is awash with cash, Al Qaeda is struggling for every dime? This is the supposition that emerges from recent assessments by different sets of experts. But can such a thesis stand in the face of the continuing close cooperation between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and with what is now occurring in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa? International terrorism alerts are now at their highest levels since just after 9/11. And senior US officials are warning that a major terrorist attack against the United States should be considered imminent.

The thesis that Al Qaeda may be running out of cash has been given increased credence recently at the Council of Foreign Relations and several other think tanks. The fall-off in donations to al Qaeda, they maintain, stems largely from the increased pressure being placed on potential terrorist financiers by national and inteernational regulators, and may also reflect the general international economic downturn. After all, money is now tight all over. According to Treasury Assistant Secretary David Cohen “al-Qaeda is in its weakest financial condition in several years (and)…as a result, its influence is waning." Similar claims have been made by Richard Barrett who leads the group of experts supporting the work of the UN’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.

At the same time there are clear indications that Taliban cash reserves remain solid. According to a recent well sourced story in the New York Times, the Taliban continues to bring in huge sums from “the illicit drug trade, kidnappings, extortion and foreign donations.” While the Taliban’s cash flow from Afghanistan’s poppy fields comes as no surprise, the amount of foreign donations they continue to receive is a real eye opener.

According to the CIA (as reported in the Washington Post), Taliban leaders and their allies received some $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan. Soliciting, collecting, transferring, distributing and masking such transactions requires a very extensive, sophisticated and well camouflaged financial network. And, such a network could not have been constructed overnight. Let’s be clear. The Taliban inherited, and built upon, the extensive financial network already established by al Qaeda during its heyday in Afghanistan. With al Qaeda’s leaders in deep hiding, it was in the interest of both groups to turn control over this network to Taliban intermediaries. The Taliban continues to draw funds today from those same donors in Pakistan, the Gulf region, Southeast Asia and Europe that long supported al Qaeda. And, these donors continue to include a variety of Muslim fundamentalist organizations and charities, as well as wealthy Al Qaeda/Taliban supporters.

There is nothing new to claims that local al Qaeda cells are now left to fend for themselves financially. That has long been the case since al Qaeda morphed many years ago into the loose network of cells that now carry out its terrorist attacks. They have always had to rely on their own financial sources, except when it comes to mounting a major attack. The situation in Yemen is quite different. There al Qaeda remains well organized and well funded. “Those who finance al-Qaeda in Yemen are the same who finance it in Afghanistan and Iraq, and used to finance it in (Saudi Arabia) before they were defeated," according to Yehia Ali al-Rai the speaker of the Yemeni parliament. So, lets withhold declaring our success in strapping al Qaeda for cash, at least until we can make the same claim vis a vis the Taliban.