The Political Conundrum!

Last month a senior U.S. delegation visited key world capitals to stress the risks incurred by foreign banks as they continue to do business with Iran. Indeed, Tehran -- mirroring the Iranian banking sector's deceptive financial practices -- has successfully evaded sanctions by setting up a network of front companies, procurement agents, businesses, and transporters as a means of procuring controlled military and dual-use technologies. Of equal concern are the re-export loopholes through which Iran has successfully evaded sanctions in the past.

Yesterday, the Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hosted Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) John T. Morton to discuss "Combating Export Violations to Iran: The Role of ICE Homeland Security Investigations." This event was part of the Institute's ongoing lecture series with senior U.S. counterterrorism officials.

Mr. Morton's prepared remarks are available here. An audio link is available here.

Despite an online petition drive and pressure campaign to release militant cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, both the evidence against him and the Indonesian authorities' confidence in prosecuting him are greater than the two other times he was arrested. For an analysis of the case against Bashir and what the recent investigations tell us about the state of Jemaah Islamiyah, please see my recent article "Fall of the Teflon Terrorist?" in the Australia/Israel Review.

The Washington Post kindly invited me to contribute a column to their "On Faith" blog regarding the latest controversy over the proposed Cordoba House Muslim community center in New York near the site of "Ground Zero." See below:

http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/08/by_evan_f_kohlmann_the.html

Bitter religious fighting over mosque plays right into al-Qaeda's hands

By Evan F. Kohlmann

The way that renowned Christian preacher Franklin Graham portrayed Muslims on a nationally-televised news broadcast last week, one would imagine that Islam is some sort of insidious cancer devouring the civilized world. Between his nauseating description of Islam as a "devilish" faith and his nonsensical discussion about the "Muslim seed" of President Obama, Graham managed to shame not only himself, but also the very democratic, pluralist ideals that we as Americans aspire to. I watched in disgust as his uninterrupted tirade continued, and it suddenly occurred to me that some viewers might not recognize that Graham speaks only for a prejudiced minority, whose numbers have been artificially inflated by the cynical recent tactics of various political candidates. To that segment of viewers, Graham instead represents the larger, ugly face of American xenophobia and prejudice--and in doing so, this self-described "man of God" has merely provided extra ammunition for al-Qaeda to use in its battle against us, our constitutional ideals, and our ethos of personal freedom...

Click to view the entire column at the Washington Post "On Faith" Blog

The fatal cross-border shooting of an Israeli soldier by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in early August has sparked a debate in Washington as to the utility of providing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Lebanese military. Since 2005, the US has obligated over $700 million to the army, which has less than 50,000 troops.

The robust program was started in the immediate aftermath of the Cedar Revolution. But much has changed since then, and Congress is asking whether the policy is still appropriate. Of particular concern is the relationship of the Shiite militia Hizballah to the standing army. There is a history of collusion and cooperation, which, although not surprising, remains problematic.

Over the past week, I’ve written two articles discussing in detail US funding for the LAF. The first piece provides the history and context of US military assistance to the LAF. The second addresses the policy issues and asks what, if anything, should cause the US to downgrade its FMF program with Lebanon.

Ever since senior Obama administration advisers such as CIA Director Leon Panetta and Vice President Biden admitted that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan was minimal, with fewer than 100 operatives believed to be on the ground there, war critics have complained the President has little justification for escalating the U.S. commitment there.

But the inside-the-Beltway political debate underscores a fundamental misunderstanding of what Al Qaeda’s role in Afghanistan — which Osama Bin Laden’s minions call “Khorasan” — truly has been, according to Special Operations commanders and troops on the ground.

Today’s Washington Post makes hay of the fact that Al Qaeda is barely mentioned in the 76,000 pages of war files released last month by WikiLeaks. The story overlooks two key facts: (1) The voluminous files are mostly “sigact” - “significant action” - combat reports dispatched as incidents happened; and (2) troops who faced Arabs in battle fighting alongside Afghan “Taliban” rarely knew, even after they had killed them, that they were up against non-Afghan opponents.

Critics also fail to realize that a single Al Qaeda operative’s knowledge and experience in guerrilla and terror tactics is of incalculable value as a force multiplier to the Taliban.

Al Qaeda’s Arab operatives are considered a fearless elite. They have knowledge of Islam that makes them seem like religious scholars to many Pashtun tribesmen, who they have led into battle in the past. After Al Qaeda fled Afghanistan’s cities with their Taliban government allies in 2001-02, they reorganized and reconstituted their ranks in Pakistan. Al Qaeda returned to the fight in 2004, training, equipping and often leading or joining Haqqani fighters in battle along the eastern border.

Their presence was often suggested by the tactics used by Haqqani fighters, the cells’ skill at accurately firing AK-47s and RPGs, and gear such as armor-piercing ammo, body armor and night-vision devices.

Today, as they withstand CIA’s withering drone onslaught in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the Arabs are more low-key in their Afghan ops than they were in the past. The CIA’s targeted killing of Skeik Mustafa Abu al-Yazid after he left Mir Ali may also have impacted their activities on the other side of the AfPak.

Arabs from Al Qaeda still fund and train the Taliban, but no longer lead operations from the front, Army Col. Donald C. Bolduc, who leads the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, told me in his office at Bagram Airfield this month.

“They’re considered much too valuable to risk that,” said another U.S. official in the war zone.

During the winter, Taliban leaders ensconced in Pakistan send in Al Qaeda operatives to train their fighters in bombmaking tradecraft during the lull in fighting, sources said.

“The Pakistani madrassahs are still the big recruiting and training place. The Afghans go to a madrassah in Pakistan, where an Arab is typically like the dean, or headmaster, and learn how to fight,” the official told me. “Then the Afghan goes back home and teaches others to build bombs or fight — and gets paid handsomely for it.”

Meanwhile, as we reported in today's New York Daily News, Taliban leaders in key Afghanistan districts have been "shwacking" each other (Special Forces term) to jockey for "permanent" leadership positions after the U.S. begins to draw down forces next year.

On Saturday morning, I appeared on Fox News to discuss whether militants in Pakistan could recruit among the millions of flood victims. The story began with a statement made by US Senator John Kerry, the first American official to visit the flood-hit areas, “We don’t want additional jihadists (and) extremists coming out of a crisis.” The idea that the human tragedy in Pakistan is a “frightening opening for the Taliban” is not yet substantiated but certainly makes for sensational news. We should remember that the Taliban is and has never been a charitable organization. The Taliban does not have a social services institute, and instead, boasts of enforcing and providing justice and order in the form of Qazi courts (i.e., harsh interpretation of Shariah law).

While American security may be linked to Pakistan’s future, the militant myth serves Pakistan’s political elite all too well. The message of militants moving into grief-stricken areas is largely being propagated by the Pakistani Government. This past week, at a United Nations donor meeting, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi stated “The massive upheaval caused by the floods and the economic losses suffered by the millions of Pakistanis must be addressed urgently. We cannot allow this catastrophe to become an opportunity for the terrorists." Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari makes a similar argument. In his visit to flood-hit areas with Kerry, Zardari said at a joint press conference, “The children could be put in camps to be trained as the terrorists of tomorrow.”

There is little truth to these arguments. So why make them? In reality, Pakistan needs increased aid to rise above its latest crisis of crises. By invoking the rise of the militant mafia, Pakistan can woo America into donating millions more. Pakistan can convince the international aid community that it cannot survive without its support. But more aid to the Pakistani government is met with great skepticism and suspicion.

On Saturday morning, I appeared on Fox News to discuss whether militants in Pakistan could recruit among the millions of flood victims. The story began with a statement made by US Senator John Kerry, the first American official to visit the flood-hit areas, “We don’t want additional jihadists (and) extremists coming out of a crisis.” The idea that the human tragedy in Pakistan is a “frightening opening for the Taliban” is not yet substantiated but certainly makes for sensational news. We should remember that the Taliban is and has never been a charitable organization. The Taliban does not have a social services institute, and instead, boasts of enforcing and providing justice and order in the form of Qazi courts (i.e., harsh interpretation of Shariah law).

While American security may be linked to Pakistan’s future, the militant myth serves Pakistan’s political elite all too well. The message of militants moving into grief-stricken areas is largely being propagated by the Pakistani Government. This past week, at a United Nations donor meeting, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi stated “The massive upheaval caused by the floods and the economic losses suffered by the millions of Pakistanis must be addressed urgently. We cannot allow this catastrophe to become an opportunity for the terrorists." Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari makes a similar argument. In his visit to flood-hit areas with Kerry, Zardari said at a joint press conference, “The children could be put in camps to be trained as the terrorists of tomorrow.”

There is little truth to these arguments. So why make them? In reality, Pakistan needs increased aid to rise above its latest crisis of crises. By invoking the rise of the militant mafia, Pakistan can woo America into donating millions more. Pakistan can convince the international aid community that it cannot survive without its support. But more aid to the Pakistani government is met with great skepticism and suspicion.

The Wall Street Journal Asia just posted an article my colleague V.S. Subrahmanian and I wrote on the ongoing game of catch-up intelligence agencies are forced to play as terrorists quickly adopt and adapt the latest communications technologies.

* OPINION INDIA * AUGUST 22, 2010

Keeping Tabs on Terrorists
India's spat with the maker of the Blackberry underlines a broader technological challenge for intelligence agencies.

By V.S. SUBRAHMANIAN AND AARON MANNES

The war on terror came closer to home this month, when the Indian government pressured Canadian company Research in Motion to hand over encryption keys for its popular Blackberry device. New Delhi claims terrorists are using the company's secure networks for covert communications. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—all of which face significant terror threats—have also expressed concern. But such moves may do more harm than good.

India's concern is clearly justified: Terrorists are using new media sources to facilitate covert communications that—directly or indirectly—have led to numerous deaths. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System, Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), perpetrator of the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks, is responsible for over 700 fatalities in India during the last five years.

But publicly browbeating RIM into providing its encryption keys is a Pyrrhic victory. Terrorist organizations can only survive if they study the capabilities of their adversaries and adapt. Terrorist organizations backed by intelligence agencies tend to be even more sophisticated. If terrorists know that Blackberries are monitored, terrorists will not employ them—or will do so only in combination with other channels of communication in order to evade intelligence agencies. The much-publicized nature of India's threat to Blackberry thus may well have compromised potential operational gains.

LeT's Mumbai attack shows how quickly terrorists adapt to new technology.

Read the full article here.

Well, it is a day I had long predicted would never occur, but I have never been happier to be wrong. A Thai appeals court today ruled the Russian weapons merchant Viktor Bout could be extradited to stand trial in the United States.

Bout not only supplied the Taliban and the FARC in Colombia, both designated terrorist organizations. He also helped arm some of the most murderous regimes and groups in Africa (Charles Taylor, Mubut Sese Seko the RUF, UNITA etc.) and the genocidal regime in Sudan. These actions are detailed in my book, with Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible (Wiley 2007).

Bout should be extradited in about a week, although the Russian government has already made clear it will do what it can to slow the process even further. There is, under Thai law, no further appeal allowed of this ruling.

Bout's extradition request is based on an elaborate and successful operation by the DEA's Special Operations Division, where informants posed as representatives of the FARC seeking to buy weapons to fight in Colombia, and specifically to kill Americans. Bout took the bait and arrived in Bangkok March 2008 with a laptop full of pictures of the toys he could deliver to them, including unmanned drones, RPGs and the promise of surface-to-air missiles.

When he finished his presentation he was arrested by Thai police, having said more than sufficient to build a case. He then spent the next 2.5 years fighting extradition to the United States, where similar cases, using similar tactics, have led to quick convictions.
My full blog is here.

Although it is wracked by floods, violence, and other tragedies, this small story from rural Pakistan caught my eye recently:

SHIKARPUR: Ten people were killed in an armed clash between Magsi and Qambrani tribes in the jurisdiction of Golodaro police station on Thursday evening.

According to sources, the gunbattle followed a brawl over irrigation of paddy crops near Kuddan village.

The sources said the Qambrani tribe lost seven men while the Magsi tribe lost three.

Sanaullah Abbasi, a senior police official, told Dawn five bodies had been recovered.

A big police contingent stormed the village late in the evening and brought the situation under control.

According to a letter to Pakistan’s excellent daily The Dawn this incident was by no means exceptional.

This story encapsulates several important realities about Pakistan: declining resources, the increasing violence over the declining resources and the inability of the government to control this violence.

This is a miniature of the violence that has recently wracked Karachi – also fundamentally a conflict over land and resources. These riots are unfortunately endemic to Pakistan’s commercial capital. Just two years ago, on the weekend that the world watched as Mumbai suffered from an overflow of Pakistan’s internal disorder, Karachi was suffering its own outbreak of violence in which at least 40 people were killed, not unlike the recent fighting.

The great fear of the West is Pakistan falling under the control of radical Islamists. The great fear of Pakistan’s leadership is the state fracturing (this is probably #2 for the West – a nuclear Yugoslavia.) But the endemic low level violence suggests another possibility, the state dissolving – a nuclear Somalia.

Medium and Long-Term Dangers
Meanwhile the terrible flooding is testing the capabilities of Pakistan’s institutions and they are failing. Their record at providing immediate relief is mediocre. But the floods have destroyed Pakistan’s crops, so that the country (which is already broke) will be forced to buy or beg food abroad. It will be several years before Pakistan’s agricultural production will return to their previous levels – so food shortages will be an ongoing problem. Even without the crisis food security was a problem in Pakistan. In addition, cotton crops, essential to Pakistan’s major export industry – textiles – have also been devastated. All of this can only further weaken an already precarious economy.

Assuming the floods and their aftermath do not lead to state dissolution it certainly weakens Pakistan for facing its longer-term crises.

Read the full post here.